I. INTRODUCTION
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, I the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania was not constitutionally required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a fact 2 that would affect the length of the sentences the defendants would receive upon conviction. In deciding this question, the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act. 3 That Act 4 provides that a person convicted of certain enumerated felonies is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the sentencing judge, when considering the evidence, finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the felony. The Pennsylvania court convicted each of the defendants in McMillan of various felonies covered by the Act. 5 This Note examines judicial and academic constructions of the due process clause of the fifth amendment in order to highlight the due process issues presented in McMillan. This Note then examines recent due process cases, finding that McMillan is part of a broader effort on the part of the Supreme Court 6 to limit the scope of its decisions in In re Winship 7 and Mullaney v. Wilbur 8 and, consequently, the applicability of the due process clause to the criminal law.
II. BACKGROUND
The fifth and fourteenth amendments state that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 9 Thus, proceedings which threaten any of these interests must comply with certain procedures embodied in the term due process of law. This potentially straightforward analysis has been complicated in a number of ways.
The process that is due under the fifth amendment due process clause differs with the type of proceeding involved. 1 0 Certain requirements imposed on criminal trials by the Constitution may not extend to other kinds of proceedings. Furthermore, the requirements of due process vary not only with the kind of proceeding but also with the particular situation.II Accordingly, although "in many respects [a state's capital sentencing hearing] resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence," [it] need not comply with the sixth and fourteenth amendments regarding jury requirements.' 2 Similarly, the juvenile justice system must follow some, but not all, of the procedures prescribed by the due process clause.' 3 Finally, the eson a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Section one of the fourteenth amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, cl. 1. 10 See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 12 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1984) . 13 The Supreme Court has made it clear that there is a constitutional distinction between a criminal trial and a juvenile proceeding:
We do not mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)(quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) ). The Supreme Court has held that juveniles may avail themselves of a number of constitutional protections. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975)(holding that double jeopardy protections apply to criminal proceedings subsequent to adjudicatory hearings in juvenile courts); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that standard of proof in delinquency hearings must meet the reasonable doubt standard which is a requirement of due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967)(holding that delinquency hearings must guarantee such due process rights as timely notice, right to counsel, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and protection against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)(holding that decision to transfer ajuvenile to adult court is a critical phase of processing at which right to due process attaches). However, sentials of due process in the context of an agency rulemaking proceeding differ from those required in an adjudicatory context.' 4 There is also some indication that the three protected interests (life, liberty and property) are not necessarily coequal. The Court has characterized a citizen's liberty interest as "an interest of transcending value."' 15 This statement indicates that the due process clause demands a great deal of procedural protection when a defendant's liberty interest is at stake.' 6 In addition to the above distinctions, which are constitutionally significant, the Supreme Court has considered a number of other approaches in determining what process is due. The positivist position' 7 on procedural due process continues to receive the support of some academics' s and members of the judiciary.' 9 The positivists in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court held that the due process rights of juveniles charged with unlawful conduct do not include the right to trial by jury. A number of recent decisions make it clear that the Court is withdrawing or declining to extend constitutional guarantees to those subject to the juvenile justice system. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (holding that school officials need not seek a warrant and need not have probable cause to believe that any rule or law has been violated in order to search students); Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984)(upholding a provision of the New York Family Act that provides for the pre-trial detention of juveniles if it were the opinion of the juvenile court that such juveniles would present a risk to themselves or others were they not detained); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)(upholding a Georgia statute which provides for the commitment ofjuveniles to state mental hospitals without the requirement of any adversary hearing); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)(holding that fifth amendment protections against selfincrimination did not apply to a juvenile taken into police custody).
14 See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908)("Many requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with [in the administrative forum].").
15 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) . 16 In at least two dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens has stated his belief that qualitative differences exist between the three protected interests. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("a deprivation of liberty is qualitatively different from a deprivation of property"); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(arguing that the Court should not apply the Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit analysis when a person's liberty interest is at stake).
17 For a discussion of the positivist position in the due process context as compared with the legal philosophy of positivism, see Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1071 n.141 (1984) .
18 Professor Easterbrook analyzes the historic antecedents of the due process clause, the structure of the Constitution, and early due process cases and concludes that the legislature's determination concerning what procedures are to be followed constitutes due process of law. As a result, there is nothing for the judiciary to review. LJ. 455 (1986) .
19 Based on his review of historical sources,Justice Black believed that due process of law means law of the land. Therefore, any legislative enactment which does not offend other sections of the Constitution meets the requirements of due process because it 648 [Vol. 77
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believe that due process of law mandates no more than compliance with whatever procedures the legislature has mandated shall be followed. 20 As recent cases illustrate, tests favored by the Supreme Court in the past have not been conclusively discarded nor are any of the approaches described above mutually exclusive. 2 9 Although the positivist construction of due process was rejected by the Court long ago, 30 Justice Black 3 1 recently advocated this interpretative approach, and Justice Rehnquist 3 2 presently holds this view. Moreover, the Supreme Court has combined the historical and fundamental fairness tests in its due process analysis. Stating that due process contains the notion of "fundamental procedural fairness," 3 3 the Court has drawn its ideas of fairness in part from the "historically grounded rights of our system" embodied in "the com-27 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
28
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. In reality the Mathews test and the positivist approach are often functionally equivalent. Presumably, in enacting the legislation under review the legislature has already undertaken a cost-benefit analysis similar, if not identical to, the approach described in Mathews. Furthermore, it has done so while having within its possession superior amounts of information and data concerning the likely effects upon individuals, society, and the judicial system as a whole of various procedural schemes. Therefore, in the absence of an obvious miscalculation or blatant disregard of relevant data, the Court is likely to respect the legislature's decision. (a) Mandatory sentence-Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery... aggravated assault.. . kidnapping, or who is convicted of attempt to commit any of these crimes, shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. (b) Proof at sentencing-Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime.... The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.
fendants of various felonies covered by the Act. 44 Following the defendants' conviction, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gave notice that it would seek to proceed under the Act 4 5 at sentencing. In each case, however, the sentencing judges found the Act unconstitutional and imposed lesser sentences than those required by the statute. 4 6 All four cases were appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which consolidated the Commonwealth's appeals.
7
The appellees advanced two principal arguments. First, they contended that visible possession of a firearm was "an element of the crimes for which they were being sentenced and thus must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under In re Winship... and Mullaney v. Wilbur." 4 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the legislature had expressly stated that visible possession "shall not be an element of the crime" 4 9 and that according to Patterson v. New York 5 0 the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard was a function of how the state defined the offense.
Appellees also asserted that even if visible possession is not an element of the offense, due process still requires more than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 1 Rejecting the appellant's contention, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Act did not create a series of upgraded felonies of which visible possession was an element because the Act became operative only after conviction and served merely to limit the sentencing judge's discretion. 52 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the Act was consistent with In re Winship, Mullaney and Patterson in that it did not create a presumption with respect to any fact constituting an element of the crimes in question. 5 3 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the state had a compelling interest in deterring the illegal use of firearms and that the defendants' liberty interest had been substantially diminished by the guilty verdicts. 54 Therefore, the court held (c) Authority of court in sentencing-There shall be no authority in any court to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser sentence than provided for in subsection (a) or to place such offender on probation or to suspend sentence. 44 
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that the preponderance standard satisfied due process. 55 The court then vacated appellees' sentences and remanded for sentencing pursuant to the Act. 5 6 The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and affirmed the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
57
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE PLURALITY OPINION
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of the Court, affirmed and expanded the reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Court stated that its holding was "controlled by Patterson... rather than Mullaney" 5 8 and found Pennsylvania's statute to be constitutional since visible possession of a firearm was not an element of the crimes for which the petitioners were convicted. 5 9 The Court deferred to the states' preeminent interest in defining and controlling crime. 60 The plurality relied on Patterson 6 1 for the proposition that there were constitutional limits beyond which the states could not go in this regard. 62 Although the plurality concluded that Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act did not exceed those limits, the Court declined to specifically define them. 65 Rather, the majority advanced as an example of unconstitutionality the Patterson Court's rather "unremarkable proposition that the due process clause precludes states from discarding the presumption of innocence." ' ' The Court observed that Pennsylvania's statute did not create this type of presumption, nor did it in any way "relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt." ' 65 The plurality distinguished its holding from Mullaney 6 6 and Specht v. Patterson 6 7 on the basis of the difference between the Pennsylvania statute and the statutes at issue in those cases. The defendant in Mullaney, depending on the presence or absence of the mitigating or aggravating factor at issue, faced "'a differential in 
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sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence.' "68 The defendants in McMillan, the Court observed, were subjected to the same maximum length of incarceration regardless of sentencing pursuant to the Act. 69 According to the majority, Specht was similarly distinguishable. The Colorado statute in that case was held to violate due process because it provided that a person convicted of a sexual offense, carrying a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment, could be exposed to an indefinite or life sentence if a sentencing judge found that the defendant posed a threat to society. 70 The majority also dismissed the petitioners' assertion "that had Winship already been decided at the time of Specht, the Court would have also required that the burden of proof as to the post-trial findings be beyond a reasonable doubt." 7 '
In response to the petitioners' concern that states might restructure their criminal codes to evade the rule of In re Winship, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for all elements of a crime, the Court remarked that "[t]he Pennsylvania legislature did not change the definition of any existing offense." 72 The Court also observed that the fact that a number of the state legislatures have made possession of a weapon an element of certain criminal offenses does not render Pennsylvania's approach to weapons possession unconstitutional. 73 The Court held that Pennsylvania could "treat 'visible possession of a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense." The Court concluded that the use of the preponderance standard at sentencing satisfied due process since " [ In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens analyzed Patterson and In re Winship and reviewed the purposes behind the reasonable doubt standard, showing that the majority incorrectly relied on Pennsylvania's definition of the elements of prohibited conduct. Beginning with a brief recitation of the facts, he noted that the trial judges, as well as the superior court judges, who heard the appeals "all concluded that visible possession of a firearm was an element of the offense[s]" for which the defendants were being punished and thus, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 0 Justice Stevens noted that while agreeing "that visible possession of a firearm is conduct that the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended to prohibit," 8 ' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nevertheless held that this factor was not an element of the offenses. The court's holding was grounded in its conclusion that the Pennsylvania General Assembly stated in the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act that provisions of that Act "shall not be an element of the crime." Justice Stevens concluded his dissent with a discussion of aggravating and mitigating facts and the methods by which a state may criminalize certain types of conduct. 8 8 Justice Stevens hypothesized a number of statutes which would criminalize seemingly innocent forms of conduct and allow a number of affirmative defenses. 89 The due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not apply to proof of the affirmative defenses, because the interests protected by the due process clause are safeguarded by "the continued functioning of the democratic process." 90 Such legislation would never "command a majority of the electorate." 9 1
Justice Stevens stated, however, that "[i]t is not at all inconceivable.., to fear that a State might subject those individuals convicted of engaging in antisocial conduct to further punishment for aggravating conduct not proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 92 By impinging upon the individual's "interest in avoiding both the loss of liberty and the stigma that results from a criminal conviction," the presence of these aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 3 Accordingly, Justice Stevens found that proof of visible possession of a firearm under Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act must meet the reasonable doubt standard of due process. The statute involved in that case required the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence in order to reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter. The Patterson Court also presented a revisionist history of Mullaney in an attempt to limit some of the implications arising from this earlier decision. 10 In In re Gault, the Court stated that although the requirements imposed by the fourteenth amendment vary depending on the type of proceeding involved, the due process clause requires that an adjudicatory hearing to determine juvenile delinquency must comport with " 'the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' 104 The Court, in In re Winship, held that the reasonable doubt standard of proof was one of the essentials of due process. The Court stated its holding in broad terms:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.' 0 5
In one respect, In re Winship was a rather unremarkable decision. In granting constitutional protection to the reasonable doubt standard, In re Winship merely confirmed the existing state of affairs regarding the degree of proof required in criminal cases.' 0 6 At the same time, however, the language used and the circumstances of the case indicate a more general holding. In re Winship dealt specifically with the burden of proof required in ajuvenile delinquency hearing. Yet the Supreme Court presented its decision in the form of a rule that was not limited to the facts of that case. Furthermore, the Court in Winship applied a rule used within the context of a criminal trial to a juvenile delinquency proceeding. As a result, such words as "conviction," "fact," and "crime" were left open to creative definition.
There The Court described the historical prevalence of the reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials and cited many of its earlier opinions where it had assumed that this burden of proof was constitutionally mandated with respect to a criminal charge. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It is only because of the nearly complete and long-standing acceptance of the reasonable-doubt standard by the States in criminal trials that the Court has not before today had to hold explicitly that 
absence of every factor, including the definitional elements of the offense, having an impact on penal liability. The formalistic interpretation 0 9 of In re Winship requires a state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only those elements included in the state's definition of the offense. 110 The Supreme Court's decisions in Mullaney I I I and Patterson 1 12 help to clarify the parameters of the holding in In re Winship.
In Mullaney, the Supreme Court of the United States held unconstitutional a Maine homicide statute" 3 that placed upon the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted "in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation" in order to secure a manslaughter conviction. fendant the most procedural protection possible, the Supreme Court in Mullaney rendered a decision which promised to serve poorly the interests of future defendants. In Patterson, 126 the Supreme Court moved to limit the scope of its decision in Mullaney and to stop what it regarded as the overconstitutionalization of the criminal process. 12 7 The decision also reflected the Court's concern with the administrative costs associated with the requirements of due process. 128 The Patterson Court upheld a New York statute' 29 requiring a defendant charged with second-degree murder to prove extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence in order to be convicted of manslaughter. 130 The Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that sudden provocation and malice aforethought were mutually exclusive. 13 1 Consequently, Maine's requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proving the former by a preponderance of the evidence was the same as requiring the defendant to prove the absence of the latter. Therefore, according to the Patterson Court, the statute in Mullaney was declared unconstitutional because its presumption concerning a mitigating factor was, in effect, a presumption concerning an element of the crime.' 3 2 The Court stated that, on the contrary, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance "does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder."' The Supreme Court was also concerned with economic efficiency and the administrative costs associated with the requirements of due process.' 3 9 The Court acknowledged Justice Harlan's statement in In re Winship that the reasonable doubt standard is based on a fundamental value determination that it is worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty one go free. 140 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and [Vol. 77
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To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.
14 4
In constructing its criminal code, the state legislature must weigh the costs associated with the placement of these burdens upon the state against the magnitude of the individual interests at stake. The Supreme Court may have omitted mentioning Mathews for a number of reasons. The Mathews decision concerned an administrative procedure and, therefore, may be of limited applicability to the criminal law. The Court also may have been dissuaded from employing a strictly economic approach in determining what process is due in criminal cases because of the transcendent value placed upon life and liberty. A cost/benefit analysis would serve only to denigrate those interests.
Following the formalist approach laid down in Patterson,' 4 5 the Supreme Court in McMillan declined to hold that due process required the use of the reasonable doubt standard of proof with regard to the issue of visible possession of a firearm. 14 6 The Court rested its decision on the fact that "the Pennsylvania legislature has expressly provided that visible possession of a firearm is not an element of the crimes enumerated in the mandatory sentencing statute." 14 7 est to any greater degree than that which had already occurred upon conviction.
The Court had applied this approach to the facts within its earlier decision in Specht v. Patterson.' 5 ' According to the majority, Specht was similarly distinguishable because the Colorado statute which was held to violate due process in that case stated that a person convicted of a sexual offense, otherwise carrying a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment, would be exposed to an indefinite or a possible life sentence if the sentencing judge found that the defendant posed a threat to society. 1 52 The Court's subtle use of the interests test of Mullaney helps explain justice Rehnquist's rather sudden concession to Mullaney contained in his statement that "in certain limited circumstances Winship's reasonable doubt requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements of the offense charged." 15 3 The Court thus left open the possibility of applying the reasonable doubt standard to factors not included in the state's definition of the offense. In justifying its conclusion under both Mullaney and Patterson, the Court made its decision virtually unassailable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court rendered its decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania against the background of a complex and ever-changing due process analysis. 154 The requirements of due process vary depending on the type of proceeding involved.' 5 5 Furthermore, the three protected interests, life, liberty and property, are not necessarily equal.1 5 6 Finally, the Supreme Court has employed various methods to determine what process is due. These methods have ranged from an application of procedures in existence at the time of the American Revolution, to those procedures deemed to be "fair," to a test which balances the relative burdens a given procedurewould place upon the state or individual. The McMillan Court adopted the concerns of Patterson and enforced that decision. Such concerns included the fear that the application of the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all factors having an effect on the defendant's interests in liberty and reputation would cause the state to remove from its laws all such mitigating or aggravating factors.' 63 The Court also showed concern about economic efficiency and the need to weigh the burdens upon the state to prove a mitigating circumstance. 164 McMillan v. Pennsylvania is thus part of the Burger Court's broad effort to limit the applicability of the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal context.
